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Abstract
We apply a mechanism design approacht oat r a d i n gp o s te n v i r o n m e n t
where the household type space (tastes over variety) is continuous and it is
costly to set up shops that trade diﬀerentiated goods. In this framework,
we address Hotelling’s [3] venerable question about where shops will en-
dogenously locate in variety space across environments with and without
money. Money has a role in our environment due to anonymity. Our spe-
ciﬁc question is whether monetary exchange leads to more product variety
than an environment without money (i.e. a barter economy). We show
that an eﬃcient monetary mechanism does in fact lead to more product
variety available to households provided the discount factor is suﬃciently
high, costs of operating shops are suﬃciently low, and there is suﬃcient
heterogeneity in tastes and abilities. We then show how this allocation
can be implemented in a trading post economy with money. The paper is
an attempt to integrate monetary theory and industrial organization.
1 Introduction
The question we address in this paper is whether monetary exchange can pro-
mote product variety. The framework we use to answer this question is a dy-
namic version of a trading post economy where agents have preferences over a
continuum of varieties of goods. Since it is costly to set up trading posts, there
is a ﬁnite set of active shops and where they decide to locate in the variety space
is endogenously determined.
The paper is related to three diﬀerent strands of literature. Shapley and
Shubik [9] was one of the ﬁrst papers to study exchange in a trading post
economy. Recently, Howitt [4] extended this framework to one with possibilities
of both barter and monetary trading posts and established conditions under
which monetary exchange was preferred to barter. Our paper diﬀers from his in
two crucial aspects. First, our product space is not exogenously given. Instead
the variety of goods produced is endogenously determined by ﬁrms’ choosing
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1where to locate in the product space as in Hotelling [3]. Second, we study the
problem in a mechanism design framework as in Kocherlakota and Wallace [8]
and then implement the allocation as a trading post economy.
Starting with the insights of Kiyotaki and Wright [6] about the essentiality
of ﬁat money in bilateral matching environments with double coincidence prob-
lems, there is also a literature which studies agents’ choices over which goods
they specialize in production. Notably Camera, Reed, and Waller [1] show that
the introduction of money leads to more specialization relative to barter and can
increase welfare in a bilateral matching environment with divisible goods and
Nash bargaining. There are many diﬀerences between our work and theirs, most
notably that despite increased specialization with money, the entire exogenous
set of varieties of goods are produced in their framework.
We proceed as follows. Section II outlines the environment. Section III
states the general mechanism design problem. Section IV studies the allocation
of a planner’s problem where some of the constraints of the general mechanism
design problem are relaxed. We then show that the allocation of the relaxed
problem actually satisﬁes all the constraints of the general problem. In Section
V we show how to implement the allocation of the relaxed problem as a trading
post economy.
2 Environment
Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite. The economy is composed of a unit
measure of inﬁnitely-lived households indexed by h ∈ [0,1] and a countably
inﬁnite number of inﬁnitely-lived shopkeepers indexed by k ∈ N.Ah o u s e h o l d
is composed of two members: a shopper denoted s and a worker denoted w.
Each good is indexed by its variety ν ∈ [0,1]. We let good 0 denote ﬁat
money. Fiat money is storable, divisible, and generates no direct utility to
households or shopkeepers. Fiat money is in ﬁxed supply and distributed uni-
formly, in per capita amount m, at the beginning of time to households only.
The quantity of money held by a household in period t is denoted m(t)a n dt h e
quantity held by shopkeeper k is denoted Mk(t).
All goods other than money are nonstorable and consumable. Let V =( 0 ,1]
be the set of such consumable goods, which are also divisible. Households are
heterogeneous with respect to their tastes in much the same way as Kiyotaki and
Wright [6]. Speciﬁcally, they have a most preferred good to consume (denoted
τc ∈ V) and most preferred good to produce (τp ∈ V). As in Kiyotaki and
Wright [6], we make the assumption that a household cannot consume its own
output. The household type space is denoted by Θ = {(τc,τp) ∈ V×V } . In any
period, a household of type θ ∈ Θ has preferences deﬁned over consumption of
c units of good vc and production   ∈ {0,1} of one unit of good vp denoted by
the utility function Uθ((c,vc),( ,vp)). We further assume
Uθ((c,vc),( ,vp)) = u(c) − f(|vc − τc|) −   · f(|vp − τp|)
where f is a strictly increasing, convex function and u is a strictly increasing,
2concave function of the quantity c of good vc consumed which is bounded below.1
Households discount the future at rate β<1.
Each shopkeeper k has access to an exchange technology which allows him
to set up a trading post in any pair of goods in V∪{0} (speciﬁcally goods
(vk,b vk) ∈ (V∪{0})
2). Exchange at shopkeeper k’s trading post is limited to
its original designated pair (that is, after opening a trading post in one pair
of goods, the shopkeeper cannot open a post in a diﬀerent pair of goods in a
subsequent period). Shopkeepers cannot produce goods and trading posts are
in separate locations. All shopkeepers have identical linear preferences over
all consumable goods and incur an initial ﬁxed disutility cost κ if they set up
shop. Let Ck(t) denote shopkeeper k’s consumption of good vk,a n db Ck(t)denote
shopkeeper k’s consumption of good b vk in period t. Shopkeepers also discount
the future at rate β.
We assume that all exchange must be voluntary (i.e. there is no technology
to enforce exchange) and that there is free entry by shopkeepers.
In any period t, household identity, tastes, and money holdings (h, θ,and
mh (t)) are not observable. Shopkeeper identity, the varieties of goods at their
shop, consumption, and cash (k,(vk,b vk),(Ck, b Ck),Mk) are publicly observable.
Households can send messages (e θ, e m)a b o u t( θ,m(t)) to the shopkeepers they
visit at the trading post in any period t. This, coupled with the unobservability
of h, is consistent with our assumption that households are anonymous. Our
assumption about anonymity is consistent with shopkeepers keeping track of the
distribution of household money holdings and tastes, but not speciﬁc identities
as in Jovanovic and Rosenthal [5]. All agents have memory of their past actions
and messages sent and received.
Shopkeepers allocate the two varieties of goods received at their trading post
as follows. After receiving a message from a household, the shopkeeper oﬀers
a menu. A menu a : R → R is the set of all possible exchanges of quantities
of goods (vk,b vk) where it is understood that a negative quantity means the
good is received by the shopkeeper (having been produced by the worker). The
household member(s) chooses a pair from the menu and exchange takes place.
For example, a menu could be a rule where for q>0 units of good vk received
by the shopkeeper, the household member receives αq units of good b vk (i.e.
a = {(−q,αq):q>0} for a given α>0).
The timing in any period is as follows. First, in any of a countably inﬁnite
number of rounds at the beginning of period t, shopkeepers choose whether to
open a trading post (thereby incurring cost κ). Second, if the trading post is
opened, the shopkeeper makes a public announcement about the set of all pos-
sible menus oﬀered conditional on household messages. Third, each household
member decides whether to visit one (and only one) trading post or stay home.
Fourth, if a household member visits a shop, it sends a message to the shopkeeper
1Caplin and Nalebuﬀ [2] posit a more general, yet separable form of a utility function
where χ corresponds to v in our model, α corresponds to (τc,τp) in our model, and z is
related to our good 0. We impose more symmetry on preferences in order to obtain a cleaner
characterization of equilibrium.
3after which the shopkeeper oﬀers a menu (note that the public announcement
and the actual oﬀer may be diﬀerent since there is no commitment). Fifth, in
the event of a deviation of oﬀers from the public announcement, a household
member can announce to all other households at the trading post about the
deviation. Sixth, production, exchange, and consumption decisions take place
at each post. Finally, workers and shoppers return to their residence with any
money accumulated.
Note that the environment implies a certain set of things that agents can-
not do. First, after shopkeepers make public announcements, there can be no
cross location communication between households and/or shopkeepers. That is,
shopkeepers cannot
3 Mechanism Design Problem
A mechanism is a mapping from messages to an allocation both of which are con-
sistent with the above environment. Household anonymity is a critical assump-
tion in making the subsequent analysis simple. For any given period, after each
household sends a message about its tastes and money holdings (θ,m) ∈ Θ×R+,
an allocation is a speciﬁcation of the trading post to which each member of the
household is directed (or to remain in autarky) and what trades they should
make (which determines household production, consumption, and money hold-
ings) as well as which types of trading posts should open and what trades should
occur at those posts (which determines shopkeeper consumption). The mecha-
nism makes proposals which prescribe actions to households and shopkeepers.
Proposals can be accepted or rejected. In the case of rejection, the household
or shopkeeper is precluded from trade for that period.
In the case of household proposals, the mechanism may direct the two mem-
bers to the same location or diﬀerent locations. The mechanism proposes two
four-tuples, one to the worker and one to the shopper. A four-tuple to one of
the members of the household is
(k,ν,q,d) ∈ Υ =( N∪{0}) ×V×R × R
where k is the trading post to which the household member is sent (where we
assume that k =0/ ∈ N denotes that the household should stay home), ν is the
variety of the good to be traded, q i st h ea m o u n to ft h eg o o dt h eh o u s e h o l d
member receives (if q>0) or gives up (if q<0), and d i st h ea m o u n to fm o n e y
to be received (if d>0) or given up (if d<0). If the two proposals direct the
household members to diﬀerent trading posts, then given that trading posts are
in diﬀerent locations and there is no cross-location communication, these two
proposals must be independent. If the household members are directed to the
same trading post, the two proposals can be made conditional or independent
of one another. Let ι = 0 if the proposals are independent and ι =1i ft h e y
are conditioned on one another. The pure proposal to the household, γH,i sa
nine-tuple:
γH =( ι,(kp,νp,− ,dp),(kc,νc,c,d c)) ∈ ΓH = {0,1}×Υ × Υ.
4Given our assumptions about anonymity, the pure proposals cannot be condi-
tioned on h.Denote the mechanism allocation for any household as a function
of the household’s message in period t ∈ T by MH : T × Θ × R+ → ΓH.
In order to be consistent with the spatial, information, and enforcement
assumptions of our environment, the household can reject one of the two four-
tuples if they are directed to diﬀerent trading posts. For instance, the mech-
anism may direct a household to two diﬀerent monetary trading posts. If, for
example, the household had a lot of accumulated money balances, it might
choose to reject the ﬁrst four-tuple of the proposal but accept the second four-
tuple (i.e. consume but not produce). In contrast, if the mechanism directs
both members of a household to a barter post, since both members are at the
same location, it’s possible for the mechanism to force compliance of both parts
of the proposal (however not necessary).






k, b Ck,D k
´
∈ ΓK = V×R+ ×V×R+ × R
where Ck and b Ck are consumptions of goods νk and ˆ ν
k and Dk denotes the
change in the shopkeeper’s money holding. Note that a shopkeeper who has
positive money holdings can receive a proposal that directs him to open in
order to diminish his money holdings and consume (accomplished by directing
workers to his post). Denote the mechanism’s allocation for a shopkeeper in
period t by MK(t) ∈ ΓK.
These allocations must be feasible with respect to the spatial, information,
and commitment assumptions we have made in the environment. Here we list
those constraints. First, conditioning of household proposals implies a cross
location communication constraint:
kp 6= kc =⇒ ι =0 . (1)
Second, there must be certain consistency conditions imposed on the trading
posts:





,i ∈ {p,c} (2)
di 6=0 a n d ki = k ⇒ ˆ ν
k =0 ,i ∈ {p,c}
Dk 6=0 ⇒ ˆ ν
k =0 ,
ˆ ν
k =0 ⇒ b Ck =0 .
Third, feasibility of goods exchange at any trading post requires that if agents
5report (e θ, e m) truthfully reveal their type and money holdings
Ck ≤
Z £



























where µ(e θ, e m) denotes the measure of households reporting (e θ, e m). Fourth, the
mechanism cannot direct households to make monetary transfers in excess of
their reported money holdings.
max{0,−dp} +m a x{0,−dc} ≤ ˜ m (4)
Note that both spatial and informational frictions play a role in this constraint.
That is, the mechanism cannot propose that a household give up more money
than it reports and money cannot be transferred between shopper and worker
at two diﬀerent locations.
We must introduce some notation before addressing the incentive compat-
ibility and voluntary participation constraints. We deﬁne V t
M (θ,m)t ob et h e
present discounted utility of a household in state (θ,m)i np e r i o dt after sending
an optimal, though not necessarily truthful, message about its state when the
proposals associated with mechanism M are implemented. Speciﬁcally,
V t
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is the value of being in state (θ,m)i np e r i o dt and





















M ((θ,m),γH,ι c,ι p)i st h ev a l u eo fh a v i n gt y p eθ and money holding m
in period t,w i t hp r o p o s a lγH, and rejecting or accepting the proposals (denoted
by ιc and ιp ∈ {0,1}):
Zt




ιc (u(c) − f (τc − νc))











max{0,−ιcdc} +m a x{0,−ιpdp} ≤ m (5)
m + ιcdc + ιpdp ≤ m0 (6)
ι =1 ⇒ ιc = ιp (7)
6where γH is the mechanism’s proposal:
γH =( ι,(kp,νp,− ,dp),(kc,νc,c,d c)).
With this notation, we can write the individual rationality constraints. The
ﬁfth set of constraints assuring incentive compatibility by households can be
written:
Wt
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∀˜ θ, ˜ m (8)
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¢
(9)
for all ιc,ι p ∈ {0,1}. Since all information about shopkeepers characteristics are
public information, we need only consider their participation constraint. Thus,
if shopkeeper k opens a trading post in period t, the seventh set of constraints







Ck (n)+b Ck (n)
´
(10)
where Ck (n)a n db Ck (n) are consumption allocated to the broker k in period n
by the mechanism.







4 A Relaxed Programming Problem
In this section, we solve a programming problem where certain incentive and
r e s o u r c ec o n d i t i o n sa r er e l a x e dw h i c hp r o v i d e sa nu p p e rb o u n do n( 1 1 ) .T h e n
we show that under certain conditions, the solution for this relaxed problem
solves (11). First, we maintain resource feasibility only at the aggregate level
rather than at the level of the trading post represented by (3). That is, the total
quantity of all variety of goods consumed cannot exceed the total quantity of all
variety of goods produced in any period. Second, for the household participation
constraint (9), we only require that it is necessary for the shopper of a household
to consume at a barter shop in order to induce the worker of that household
to voluntarily produce at that barter shop. Third, we maintain the shopkeeper
participation constraint (10). We neglect all other constraints. Thus, we neglect
some constraints that must be satisﬁed in the full mechanism design problem
of maximizing households’ utility. This gives us an upper bound for household
utility which may be attainable in certain regions of the parameter space.
In this case we prove the following results.
7Lemma 1 (Relaxed Program) If κ is suﬃciently small and u0(1) is suﬃ-
ciently high, then the solution for the Relaxed Program is given by opening only
monetary shops.
Proposition 2 (Relaxed=⇒Complete) Provided the assumptions of the pre-
vious lemma hold and that β is suﬃciently high, the solution for the relaxed
problem satisﬁes all the constraints of the mechanism design problem given by
(11).
Proposition 3 (Characterization of product variety) Provided the as-
sumptions of the previous proposition hold, a monetary economy has more prod-
uct variety than an economy without money.
5 Implementation
Proposition 4 (Implementation) Provided the assumptions of the previous
proposition hold, the solution to the mechanism design problem can be imple-
mented as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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